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DAVIS, Judge: 
j^l K.P.S. (Father), the father of the two minor 
children at issue, A.M.S., the eldest and a girl, and 
A.S., a boy, appeals the trial court's order granting 
custody to the children's maternal grandparents. We 
affirm, but modify in part the court's order. 
BACKGROUND 
%L Although they never married, Father and K.V. 
(Mother) are the parents of A. M.S. and A.S. Issues of 
custody and child support were initially resolved 
through a paternity action in Arizona, where Father 
and Mother then lived, through orders of the Superior 
Court of Arizona, Maricopa County. 
^3 On December 31, 1997, Mother suffered a 
debilitating stroke and entered into a coma. As a 
result, Father and the children's maternal 
grandparents, with whom the children were living in 
Utah, Filed petitions for temporary custody with the 
Arizona court. The court awarded temporary custody 
to Father and ordered the maternal grandparents to 
turn over the children on June 5, 1998. 
\A As the deadline for turning over the children drew 
near, A.M.S. experienced stomach problems and 
stress related to concerns about living with Father. 
She indicated generally to her therapist that she had 
been sexually violated by Father and later disclosed 
to a physician and nurse that Father "sticked his 
private parts against me and said if 1 told anyone he 
would kill my Mom and he threatened me." When 
Father arrived from Arizona to receive custody of the 
children, the Division of Child and Family Services 
(DCFS) informed him of medical Findings that 
indicated A.M.S. had been sexually abused and \ 
maternal grandparents pending completion ot the 
investigation. A.M.S. was subsequently examined at 
a Children's Justice Center by another physician and 
nurse who concluded A.M.S. had been sexually 
abused. Allegations of Father's sexual abuse had 
previously been made in Arizona but were 
unsubstantiated. In addition, A.S. remembered 
instances of physical abuse, including being hung on 
a hook on a wall by Father, and both children 
recounted seeing Father physically abuse mother and 
were afraid they would be hurt i^ they returned to 
Father. 
1(5 Upon Father's return to Arizona, he moved for an 
order to show cause why the maternal grandparents 
had not complied with the temporary custody order. 
Meanwhile, DCFS filed a verified petition in Utah 
seeking an adjudication that the children were abused 
or neglected and thus within the juvenile court's 
jurisdiction, and requesting an order that, among 
other things, awarded temporary custody of the 
children to their maternal grandparents. In turn, 
Father moved to transfer jurisdiction over the Utah 
proceedings to Arizona, arguing the same was 
required under the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), see Utah Code Ann. 
§§78-45c-l to -26 (1996),1 as a modification of the 
Arizona custody order. 
j^6 The juvenile court conducted a telephone 
conference with the Arizona court regarding 
jurisdiction. Both courts agreed that entry of the Utah 
juvenile court's temporary order was an appropriate 
exercise of emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJA 
to prevent abuse of the children. The Utah court 
I further concluded that because the verified petition 
was brought by DCFS "as a child protection matter 
and is not a true motion to alter or amend the custody 
rights of [Father]," the verified petition was not "a 
custody modification matter covered by the UCCJA." 
Accordingly, it denied Father's motion to transfer 
jurisdiction. The Arizona court, however, declined to 
defer jurisdiction to the State of Utah, opting instead 
to stay its proceedings until the Utah proceedings 
were complete. 
\1 The Utah court held a pretrial hearing pursuant to 
which it directed the parties to exchange lists of 
witnesses they intended to call at trial, scheduled for 
March 3-5, 1999. In both its initial list of witnesses 
and its amended list—filed approximately three weeks 
before trial—DCFS omitted any reference to D.V., 
Mother's husband and the children's stepfather. 
Nonetheless, on the first day of trial when the court 
directed DCFS to present its first witness, DCFS 
indicated it wanted to call D.V. notwithstanding his 
omission from the witness lists, acknowledging the 
omission occurred because counsel "just plain 
overlooked him." Over Father's objection for lack of 
notice and untimeliness that deprived Father of the 
ability to investigate D. V.'s credibility and otherwise 
prepare for cross-examination, the court permitted 
D.V. to testify. 
<|8 On the second day of trial, the Guardian Ad Litem 
for the children indicated she would call the children 
to testify and asked that Father be excluded during 
this time. The Guardian asserted that exclusion was 
permitted under Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Juvenile Procedure because the children were fearful 
of Father. Father objected, arguing the motion to 
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exclude him was untimely and that he had a right to 
be present during the testimony. The court, however, 
found that the children "are young, testimony came in 
indicating that they are currently nine and seven years 
of age. There was a great deal of testimony, both from 
the therapist and from other fact witnesses yesterday 
regarding fear and anxiety they have of the father." 
Consequently, the court granted the Guardian's 
request, but accommodated Father by allowing him to 
sit in the hallwayjust outside the courtroom where he 
could listen to the testimony. Although Father 
requested to view the children's testimony via closed 
circuit television, the court explained it did not have 
the required equipment. Thus, although he objected, 
Father accepted the court's accommodation. Father's 
counsel remained in the courtroom. 
H9 After trial, the court found by clear and 
convincing evidence that based on various facts, 
including that the children were fearful of returning to 
Father and that such fears are based in reality; 
medical findings corroborated A.M.S.'s claim that she 
had been sexually abused; and A.M.S.'s injuries 
occurred during the time when she had extended 
visits with Father, Father had sexually abused A.M.S. 
The court further found by clear and convincing 
evidence that both children witnessed Father's 
physical abuse of Mother and they themselves had 
suffered severe physical abuse by Father. 
Consequently, the court determined the children were 
within thejuvenile court's jurisdiction, A.M.S. was an 
abused child, and both A.M.S. and A.S. were 
neglected. The court ordered that the maternal 
grandparents retain custody of the children and Father 
be allowed only supervised visitation. The court 
further ordered that it would defer to the Arizona 
court for the appropriate amount of child support 
Father should pay to the maternal grandparents. 
Father appeals. 
ISSUES 
TJ10 Father raises the following grounds for 
reversal: (1) because the Utah court was without 
jurisdiction to entertain the matter under the UCCJA, 
it erred in denying his motion to transfer the matter to 
the Arizona court; (2) the court erred in allowing 
D. V. to testify when DCFS failed to include D. V. in j 
its witness list; and (3) the court erred in excluding I 
Father from the courtroom during the children's 
testimony. 
ANALYSIS 
Jurisdiction under the UCCJA 
[^11 We First review the trial court's determination 
regarding its jurisdiction under the UCCJA. Because 
the competency of the juvenile court to decide the 
case raises a question as to the court's subject matter 
jurisdiction, it presents a question of law we review 
for correctness. See In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118, 123 
(UtahCt. App. 1990). 
^12 On appeal, DCFS concedes the trial court 
erred in concluding the UCCJA was inapplicable 
merely because the verified petition was filed by 
DCFS. The UCCJA expressly provides that a custody 
proceeding to which it applies "includes child neglect 
and dependency proceedings." Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45c-2(3) (1996); see also In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d 
at 123 ("By claiming it retained jurisdiction over the 
neglect allegations, the juvenile court granted 
pennancnt custody to father and thereby clearly 
modified the custody decree entered in Florida."). 
I U13 Under the UCCJA, because the Arizona court 
made the initial custody determination when all 
parties resided in Arizona and Father continues to so 
reside, a Utah court generally may not modify that 
determination. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) 
(1996); Liska v. Liska, 902 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (stating that the decree state continues to 
havejurisdiction when father continues to reside there 
and have visitation contact with children and "[t]he 
continuing jurisdiction of the court in which the 
I decree originated is intended to remain exclusive"); 
Crump v. Cnwip? 821 P.2d 1172, 1177 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (holding that jurisdiction did not shift to 
Utah from Montana when mother and children moved 
there because father remained in Montana); In re 
D.S.K., 792 P.2d at 124 ("'The jurisdiction of state A 
continues and is exclusive as long as the husband 
lives in state A . . . ."') (citation omitted; emphasis 
omitted). Hence, Father is correct that ordinarily the 
maternal grandparents should have brought their 
request for custody and the evidence of abuse on 
which it was based to the Arizona court. 
1J14 Nonetheless, under section 78-45c-3(l)(c) a 
Utah court may make a temporary custody 
determination if the child is present in Utah and "it is 
necessary in an emergency to protect the child 
because he has been subjected to" or threatened with 
mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected or 
dependent." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l )(c) (1996). 
As this court explained, emergency jurisdiction '"is 
reserved for extraordinary circumstances'" and 
"should be limited to those cases of neglect where the 
harm is immediate or imminent." In re D.S.K., 792 
P.2d at 126-27 (citation omitted). Father argues that 
the only emergency here was based on the imminent 
transfer of custody. While he may be correct that this 
alone cannot support the exercise of emergency 
jurisdiction, the imminent transfer coupled with the 
court's factual findings that by clear and convincing 
evidence the children had been physically and 
sexually abused-which findings Father does not 
challenge on appeal—was sufficient under section 
78-45c-3(l)(c). Accordingly, we conclude that the 
court could properly enter a temporary order granting 
custody of the children to the maternal grandparents. 
1J15 However, the court erred in the scope of its 
order. Emergency jurisdiction is limited to measures 
necessary to protect the children and, hence, section 
78-45c-3(l)(c) of the Utah Code does not empower 
the court "to make a permanent custody disposition." 
In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d at 127. Rather, orders entered 
through the court's emergency jurisdiction are 
temporary in nature and have effect only pending 
adjudication of the issues in the decree state. See id. 
Accordingly, we herewith modify paragraphs one and 
three of the trial court's order to the effect that the 
orders contained therein are temporary only pending 
further order of the Arizona court in the modification 
and such other proceedings as may be brought therein 
by the parties. To the extent the orders of the trial 
court herein purport to exercise anything other than 
temporary, emergency jurisdiction, the same are 
reversed. 
Admission of D.V.'s Testimony 
%\6 We now turn to Father's claim that the court 
should have excluded the testimony of D.V. because 
DCFS failed to designate him as a witness before 
trial. The court has broad discretion in determining 
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whether to allow a witness to testify and this court 
will not reverse such ruling unless it abused that 
discretion, substantially affecting Father's rights. See 
Utah R. Evid. 103(a); Gerbich v. Numed Inc., 1999 
UT37,K16, 977 P.2d 1205. 
]] 17 First, although Father is correct that the court 
could have excluded D. V.'s testimony because DCFS 
failed to comply with the court's order on witness 
disclosure, see Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41^26, 
974 P.2d 306, he simply fails to show that such 
sanction was required here. Moreover, because 
"[ejxcluding a witness from testifying is . . . 'extreme 
in nature and . . . should be employed only with 
caution and restraint,'" Berrett v. Denver & Rio 
Grande W. R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) (citation omitted; omission in original), 
we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion. 
|^ 18 Second, even if the court somehow abused its 
discretion by allowing D.V. to testify, Father has not 
shown prejudice by the ruling. Father's sole claim of 
prejudice is that D.V.'s testimony contained hearsay 
that was "inflammatory" and "susceptibilfe] to 
embellishment." However, Father was still free to 
object to those parts of D.V.'s testimony that were 
inadmissible. Hence, any admission of hearsay 
flowed not from the denial of Father's requested 
sanction from which he now appeals, but from his 
failure to make proper objections. Father also fails to 
allege what, if anything, he would have done 
differently had D.V. been designated. Accordingly, 
we reject Father's attempt to predicate reversal on 
these grounds. 
Exclusion from Courtroom During Testimony 
TI19 Finally, Father asserts this court should 
reverse because he was excluded from the courtroom 
during the children's testimony and thus was able to 
participate only by listening from the hallway. Father 
argues that his exclusion was not authorized by Utah 
Rule of Juvenile Procedure 50. While Father may be 
correct that the court failed to strictly comply with 
Rule 50, he overlooks that the juvenile court has 
broad discretion to control its proceedings. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-7-5 (1996) ("Every court has 
authority to . . . (3) provide for the orderly conduct of 
proceedings before it or its officers; [and] . . . (5) 
control in furtherance of justice the conduct of . . . all 
other persons in any manner connected with a judicial 
proceeding before it in every matter . . . ."); cf. 
Berrett, 830 P.2d at 293 ("Trial courts have broad 
discretion in managing the cases assigned to their 
courts [and w]e will not interfere with a trial court's 
case management unless its actions amount to an 
abuse of discretion.") (citation omitted). 
\2Q Here, Father concedes that the Sixth j 
Amendment right to confrontation does not apply and 
has otherwise failed to cite any authority requiring 
reversal for his exclusion from the courtroom during 
the children's testimony. Given that based on the 
court's finding that the children feared Father and 
there was a possibility that Father's presence could 
have inhibited the children's ability to testify, Father 
has not persuaded us that the court abused its 
discretion. Indeed, the court appears to have struck an 
appropriate balance by allowing Father's substantial 
participation through his counsel remaining in the 
courtroom and questioning the witnesses and Father 
listening from the hallway. Consequently, we reject 
Father's argument for reversal on this basis. 
CONCLUSION 
71| 21 We conclude that the court correctly 
determined that it could hear this matter under the 
emergency jurisdiction provision of the UCCJA. 
Nonetheless, because the court's authority under the 
UCCJA is limited to temporary orders, we modify the 
order here such that it has effect only pending final 
resolution by the Arizona court. Further, we conclude 
the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing D.V. 
to testify or by requiring Father to listen to the 
children's testimony from the hallway outside the 
courtroom. 
%L2 Affirmed and modified.2 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
1123 WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. We acknowledge the Utah Legislature recently repealed 
and reenacted the UCCJA effective July 1, 2000, and in so 
doing overruled this court's holding in In re R.N J., 908 
P.2d 345, 348-49 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), that the UCCJA 
does not apply to proceedings to terminate parental rights. 
See 2000 Senate Bill 104, § 2 (stating that the term "'child 
custody proceeding'-. . . includes a proceeding for . . . 
termination of parental rights"). Nonetheless, because those 
changes are inapplicable and would not alter our analysis 
here, we cite to the provisions in effect at the relevant times. 
2. We reject Father's request for attorney fcts and costs 
incurred below and on appeal because he made the request 
for the first time during oral argument. See Utah Med. 
Prods. Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 233-34 (Utah 1998) 
("[T]he issue of attorney fees is not properly before this 
court because it was raised for the first time on appeal."); 
Larson v. Overland Jlirift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1321 n.5 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (declining to consider issue of 
attorney fees when raised for first time in reply brief). 
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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is in this Court pursuant to the provisions of § 78-2(a)-3(c) of the Utah 
Code. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Do the provisions of the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 
U.S.C. §1738A apply to proceedings to permanently terminate parental rights of a parent by 
the Juvenile Courts of the State of Utah when the parent whose parental rights are in issue 
continues to reside in the jurisdiction (State) which granted the Decree of Divorce and 
which Court has granted and enforced grandparent visitation after entry of the Decree of 
Divorce? 
As the issue presented is interpretation of existing statutory and case law, it presents 
an issue of law which is reviewed for correctness. In Re: adoption of A.B.. 1999 UT. App. 
315,991 P.2d70,f 8. 
The issue was preserved for appeal in the trial court (R. 23-61) and was 
specifically addressed by the trial court in its memorandum decision. (R. 126-131, in 
particular R. 127-130). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES TERMINATIVE OF THE 
APPEAL 
Article VI clause 2 to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made 
in pursuance thereof,..., shall be the supreme law of the land, and the 
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or 
laws of any State to the contrary not withstanding." 
Section 1738A of Title 28 U.S.C. provides: 
(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its 
terms, and shall not modify except as provided in subsection (f) of this 
section, any child custody determination made consistently with the 
provisions of this section by a court of another state. 
(b) As used in this section, the term -
(1) "child" means a person under the age of eighteen; 
(2) "contestant" means a person, including a parent or grandparent, 
who claims a right to custody or visitation of a child; 
(3) "custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other 
order of a court providing for the custody and includes 
permanent and temporary orders, and initial orders and 
modifications; 
(4) "home State" means the State in which, immediately preceding 
the time involved, the child lived with his parents, a parent, or a 
person acting as a parent, for at least six consecutive months, 
and in the case of a child less than six months old, the State in 
which the child lived from birth with any of such persons. 
Periods of temporary absence of any of such persons are 
counted as part of the six-month or other period; 
(5) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody or visitation 
determination which modifies, replaces, supersedes, or 
otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior custody or visitation 
determination concerning the same child, whether made by the 
same court or not; 
(6) "person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent, 
who has physical custody of a child and who has either been 
awarded by a court or claims a right to custody. 
Page 2 
(7) "physical custody" means actual possession and control of a 
child; 
(8) "State" means a State of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or 
possession of the United States, and 
A child custody or visitation determination made by a court of a State 
is consistent with the provisions of this section only if-
(1) such court has jurisdiction under law of such State; and 
(2) one of the following conditions is met: 
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of 
the commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the 
child's home State within six months before the date of 
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from 
such State because of his removal or retention by a contestant 
or for other reasons, and a contestant continues to live in such 
State; 
(B)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction 
under subparagraph (a), and (ii) it is in the best interest of the 
child that a court of such state assume jurisdiction because (I) 
the child and his parents, or the child and at least one 
contestant, have a significant connection with such State other 
than mere physical presence in such State, and (II) there is 
available in such State substantial financial evidence 
concerning the child's present or future care, protection, 
training, and personal relationships. 
(C)The child is physically present in such State and (i) the child 
has been abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to 
protect the child because he has been subjected or threatened 
with mistreatment or abuse; 
(D)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction 
under subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E), or another State has 
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the State 
whose jurisdiction is in issue is more appropriate forum to 
determine the custody or visitation of the child, and (ii) it is in 
the best interest of the child that such court assume jurisdiction; 
or 
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection 
(d) of this section. 
The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody 
or visitation determination consistently with the provisions of this 
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section continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1) of 
this section continues to be met and such State remains the residence 
of the child or of any contestant. 
(e) Before a child custody determination or visitation is made, reasonable 
notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants, 
any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated 
and any person who has physical custody of a child. 
(f) A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the 
same child by a court of another State if-
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; 
and 
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has 
declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such 
determination. 
(g) A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for 
a custody or visitation determination commenced during the pendency 
of a proceeding in a court of another State where such court of that 
other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of 
this section to make a custody determination. 
(h) A court of a State may not modify a visitation determination made by a 
court of another State unless the court of the other State no longer has 
jurisdiction to modify such determination or has declined to exercise 
jurisdiction to modify such determination. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the 1995 decision of State in Interest of R.N.J.. 908 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 1995) 
this Court ruled that a petition for the voluntary termination of an adoptive parent's parental 
rights was not a custody proceeding under the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act, § 78-45c-l, et sec, of the Utah Code. The trial court applied that rational to rule in 
this case that a permanent deprivation proceeding is not a custody case, the Parental 
Kidnaping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. §1738A, did not apply to the instant action. 
That decision is erroneous under the facts of this case where Appellant had always 
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continued to reside in the state (California), the court which granted the Decree of Divorce 
and father's custodial and visitation rights and which granted visitation rights to his parents, 
the paternal grandparents (who have always resided in California). The PKPA, § 173 8A of 
Title 28 U.S.C., prevents the trial court from assuming any jurisdiction over this matter 
except to enforce the existing California court orders. 
FACTS 
The natural mother and her husband, the perspective adoptive father, filed a Petition 
for Termination of the Appellant's parental rights and for adoption of E.H.H. on June 18, 
1999 (R. 3). They alleged that the First District Juvenile Court for Box Elder County, State 
of Utah, had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to § 78-3a-104 of the Utah Code. 
The natural father and natural mother were divorced on July 21, 1995 in the State of 
California where Appellant continues to reside. (R. 3-4). Service of the adoption petition 
was effected on the natural father where he resides in San Diego County, California. (R. 7, 
14). The paternal grandparents have not been served or joined in this action despite the 
Court orders granting and enforcing their visitation rights. 
The father immediately challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear the 
matter under the PKPA (R. 19-20). The trial court was advised that after entry of the 
decree of divorce the father's parents were granted specific visitation with the minor child 
who is the subject of this action, (R. 45-51) and when K.B. failed to comply with the orders 
of the trial court (Superior Court of California, County of San Diego), and on January 20, 
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1998, after she was found to be in contempt of court on two counts, she was sentenced to 
two years probation conditioned upon her complying with all existing orders of the Court 
(R. 52-55). 
Both the Appellant and his parents continue to reside in San Diego County, State of 
California and that Court continues to actively exercise its jurisdiction. The most recent 
order of that Court was entered on May 5, 1999, see (R. 56-58). Accordingly, after service 
upon him, the natural father moved to dismiss the Petition in the First District Juvenile 
Court for Box Elder County, State of Utah, on the ground that the Utah Court did not have 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the provisions of the PKPA, § 173 8 A of Title 28 of 
the U.S.C. (R. 23-61, 88-92). After the trial court overruled Appellant's Motion to 
Dismiss, on November 8, 1999, (R. 150-155), he filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal. 
(R. 141-164). This Court granted the Petition for Interlocutory Appeal on January 24, 
2000, (R. 179), and the matter now pends here. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court, a Juvenile Court in the State of Utah, does not have jurisdiction to 
consider a Petition for Permanent Deprivation of Parental Rights which would terminate 
the custody and visitation rights of a natural parent and visitation rights of grandparents 
who have been granted court ordered visitation (but have not been joined by Petitioners) 
where the parent and grandparents continue to reside in the jurisdiction of the trial court 
that granted, and is actually enforcing, those rights under the provisions of the PKPA, 28 
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U.S.C. §1738A. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO 
TERMINATE THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF APPELLANT WHEN 
HE CONTINUES TO RESIDE IN THE JURISDICTION WHICH 
GRANTED THE DIVORCE AND IS ENFORCING VISITATION 
RIGHTS, 
In the case before the Court, the parties were divorced in the Superior Court for San 
Diego County, State of California. The Appellant, Charles Harris, continues to reside in 
that county. After the entry of the Decree of Divorce which granted KB, mother, the right 
to move to Maryland and Appellant (hereinafter father) visitation rights, his parents, 
Charles and Leanne Harris, were granted visitation rights with E.H.H. by the same court. 
Later when K.B. failed to comply with the visitation orders and secretly moved to Utah 
(concealing the child for one year), the Superior Court of California for San Diego County 
exercised its continuing jurisdiction by holding K.B. in contempt of its orders and placing 
her on probation for two (2) years. 
The provisions of the PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A which apply to this case provide: 
"The appropriate authorities of every state shall enforce according to its 
terms, and shall not modify except as provided in Subsection (f) of this 
section, any child custody determination made consistently with the 
provisions of this section by a court of another State. (Emphasis added.) 
Section 1738A(a) of Title 28 U.S.C. 
"(h) A court of a State may not modify a visitation 
determination made by a court of another State unless the court 
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of the other State no longer has jurisdiction to modify such 
determination or has declined to exercise jurisdiction to modify 
such determination." 
Section 1738(A)(h) of Title 28 U.S.C. 
As defined in Subsection (b) of Section 1738A: "contestant" means a parent or 
grandparent who claims a right to custody or visitation of a child." Subsections (3) and (5) 
provide that a modification means a change in the prior custody or visitation determination 
regarding a child and Utah is a "State" as defined in Subsection (8). 
Consequently, the courts of Utah may make a change in the custody or visitation 
orders of the Superior Court for San Diego County, State of California, only if: 
(f) "A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the 
same child made by the Court of another State, if-
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; 
and 
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has 
declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such 
determination."(emphasis added). 
Subsection (d) of the statute provides: 
(d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody 
or visitation determination consistently with the provisions of this 
section continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1) of 
this section continues to be met and such State remains the 
residence of the child or of any contestant. (Emphasis added.) 
Both Charles Harris and his parents are contestants as defined in § 1738 A(b)(2) and 
they continue to reside in San Diego County, State of California. The Superior Court for 
San Diego County is actively exercising jurisdiction over this matter. Accordingly, the 
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Courts of Utah have jurisdiction only to: 
"Enforce according to its terms and shall not modify, the existing custody and 
visitation orders." 
Section 1738A(a) of Title 28 U.S.C. 
The interrelationship between the the Uniformed Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and 
the PKPA was explored by this Court in Crump v. Crump. 821 P.2d 1172 (Utah App. 
1991). In its opinion, this court noted it had previously ruled in State in Interest of D.S.K.. 
792 P.2d 118, 128 (Utah App. 1990). 
"Where the PKPA and the state's version of the UCCJA conflict, the 
PKPA preempts state law." 
Crump, 821 P.2d at 1174. 
This Court then went on to note that UCCJA failed to address the specific problem 
of continuing jurisdiction and that was resolved by the PKPA. Crump, 821 P.2d at 1174-
1175. Then, pertinent to the instant matter, this Court stated: 
"Unlike the UCCJA, the PKPA 'anchors exclusive continuing 
jurisdiction to modify a previous custody decree in the original home 
state as long as the child or one of the contestants remains in that 
state.' Annotation, 83 A.L.R *^*1 at 748 (emphasis added). See also 
Dickens, 23 J.Fam.L..at 426. 'While under the UCCJA scheme some 
states profess to find modification jurisdiction so long as they can 
properly exercise initial custody jurisdiction, the PKPA prevents a 
second state from modifying an initial state's order except in carefully 
circumscribed situations.'" Meade v. Meade. 812 F.2d 1473, 1476 (4th 
Cir. 1987). This is clear from section (f) of the PKPA which states 
that: 
"A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody 
of the same child made by a court of another State, if-
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(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody 
determination; and 
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or 
it has declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify 
such a determination." 28 U.S.C. §1738A (1989). 
(Emphasis added.) 
821 P.2d at 1174-1175, and 
"This section explicitly limits when a State, which would 
otherwise have jurisdiction over a child custody dispute, must 
defer to the state which originally issued the custody order." 
821P.2datll75. 
Applying this rational to the instant case, it is clear that the PKPA applies and 
requires dismissal of K.B.'s petition. Consider the scenario if this Court rules the PKPA 
does not apply and permits the First District Juvenile Court for Box Elder County to hear 
the petition for permanent deprivation now before it. Should that court grant the petition 
and petition for adoption, the father and his parents could, using the PKPA, file an action to 
enforce their visitation in the District Court after the adoption has been granted by the 
Juvenile Court. The District Court would have no choice but to enforce visitation under the 
PKPA. 
In the decision of In re adoption of A.B.. 991 P.2d 70 (Utah App. 1999) this Court 
reviewed the decision of the trial court regarding grandparent visitation rights and ruled 
that Utah law, as articulated in Kasper v. Nordfelt 815 P.2d 747 (Utah App. 1991), that 
when a natural parent's parental rights are terminated, the grandparental rights to exercise 
visitation are also terminated. 991 P.2d at 76. Consequently, if the trial court in the instant 
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matter were to terminate the visitation rights of the father and his parents, it would be 
terminating both his visitation rights and the visitation rights of his parents, which it may 
not do under the PKPA. 
Since the trial court decision would terminate visitation rights of the Appellant and 
his parents, it would be modifying the decision of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 
State of California, an action it is specifically prohibited from taking under the PKPA as 
interpreted and applied by this Court in Crump supra. The PKPA, under the facts of this 
case, clearly prohibit the First District Juvenile Court for Box Elder County, State of Utah, 
from exercising jurisdiction over the petition to permanently deprive the parental rights of 
appellant. The decision of the trial judge overruling the Motion to Dismiss based on lack 
of jurisdiction should be reversed by this Court which should remand the matter and order 
the petition of K.B. and M.B. be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant seeks this Court's reversal of the trial court's decision that it has 
jurisdiction over this matter and a remand to that court with the direction to dismiss the 
Petition of Petitioners K.B. and M.B. 
DATED this 16th day of March, 2000. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of COHNE, 
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of 
HARRIS, Emily Hope 
A person under eighteen years of age 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 974919 
This matter comes before this Court on Karen Butler's and Mark Butler's Petition for 
Termination of Natural Father's Parental Rights and for Adoption of Child filed in this Court 
on June 21, 1999. Charles Erik Harris filed his Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Lack 
of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Personal Jurisdiction on September 10, 1999. Karen 
Butler and Mark Butler filed their Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Response to 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Personal 
Jurisdiction on September 22, 1999. Karen Butler and Mark Butler filed their Responsive 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities to the Supplemental Memorandum on October 14, 
1999. Oral hearing on the jurisdictional motion was held on September 29,1999. Having 
considered the foregoing, the Court now issues this Memorandum Decision. 
The undisputed facts relevant to this motion are as follows: 
1. Emily Hope Harris was born October 26, 1994, to Karen Harris nka Karen Butler 
and Charles Erik Harris. 
2. Karen Butler and Charles Eric Harris were divorced on July 21,1995, pursuant to 
an order entered by the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San 
Diego (hereinafter "California Court"). 
3. Since entry of the order of divorce, Karen Butler relocated with Emily Hope Harris 
to Maryland, and subsequently to Utah where Karen Butler and Emily Hope Harris have 
resided for in excess of two (2) years. 
4. Charles Erik Harris' parents, Charles & Leanne Harris were granted grandparent 
visitation rights in the California Court in 1995 which were subsequently revised in 1997. 
5. Karen Butler and Mark Butler were married on November 24, 1997. 
6. Karen Butler was held in contempt of court by the California Court in an Order Q$r*$£ j ^ 
Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt signed by the California Court on February 21 ,199^ * 
The contempt was for Karen Butler's failure to keep Charles & Leanne Harris informed of ^ & i0t 
Karen Butler's and Emily Hope Hams' address and phone number and to allow 
grandparent visitation. Karen Butler was sentenced to five (5) days in jail suspended upon 
Karen Butler's successful completion of two (2) years of probation without further violation 
of the California Court's order. 
7. Charles Erik Harris continues to live in California. 
Charles Erik Harris' first jurisdictional argument is that this Court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction in this case by virtue of the Parental Kidnaping Prevent Act ("PKPA"), 28 U.S.C. 
§1738A, which provides in its relevant parts as follows: 
§1738A Full faith and credit given to child custody determinations 
(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms, 
and shall not modify except as provided in subsections (f), (g), and (h) of this 
section, any custody determination or visitation determination made consistently 
with the provisions of this section by a court of another State 
(b) As used in this section, the term-
(2) "contestant" means a person, including a parent or grandparent, who 
claims a right to custody or visitation of a child, 
(3) "custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other order of 
a court providing for the custody of a child, and includes permanent and temporary 
orders, and initial orders and modifications, 
(5) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody or visitation determination 
which modifies replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior 
custody or visitation determination concerning the same child, whether made by the 
same court or not, 
At issue in this case is whether a termination proceeding brought pursuant to Section 
78-3a-401 et seq. Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, constitutes a "custody 
determination" or a "modification" of a custody or visitation determination under PKPA 
There is no Utah case directly on point on this issue. However, the Utah Court of 
Appeals addressed the question of whether a termination proceeding is a "custody 
proceeding" under Utah's Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Act, Section 78-45c-1 et 
seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended ("Utah's UCCJA"), in State of Utah in the 
interest of R.N. J., 908 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 1995)("RMJ."). In R.N.J., an adoptive father 
sought a Utah order of termination of his parental rights subsequent to his and the child's 
mother's divorce in California. The child's mother argued that the Utah court lacked 
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subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Utah's UCCJA where the California court had issued 
a divorce decree which included a custody determination. 
The Utah Court of Appeals disagreed and ruled that a termination proceeding is not 
a custody proceeding under Utah's UCCJA. The Utah Court of Appeals reasoned as 
follows: 
Rather, we conclude that a proceeding involving the termination of a parent's rights 
and obligations is not a custody proceeding under the Utah UCCJA This conclusion is 
supported by Utah's statutory scheme A "custody determination" is defined in the Act as 
"a court decision and court orders and instructions providing the custody of a child, including 
visitation rights, it does not include a decision relating to child support or any other monetary 
obligation of any person" Utah Code Ann § 78-45-45c-2(2) (1992) A "custody 
proceeding" under the Utah UCCJA, "includes proceedings in which a custody 
determination is one of several issues, such as an action of dissolution of marriage " Id § 
78-45c-2(3) Therefore, although these definitions make clear that the California case 
involving the dissolution of the parties' marriage and the custody of R N J was a custody 
proceeding under the Utah UCCJA, these definitions do not clarify whether this proceeding 
involving the termination of the adoptive father's rights and obligations also was a custody 
proceeding 
Other provisions of the Utah Code, however, lead to the conclusion that a termination 
proceeding is not a custody proceeding The Juvenile Courts Act specifically separates 
termination of parental rights proceedings and custody proceedings Juvenile Courts are 
granted exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving the termination of parent's rights 
with a limited exception not relevant here See Utah Code Ann § 78-3a-16(2)(f) 
(Supp 1995), id §78-30-4 16(1 )(b) District courts, however, have original jurisdiction over 
cases involving "questions of custody" and the juvenile court may only hear custody cases 
if they have first been certified by the district court Id § 78-3a-16(3), see also id § 78-3a-
17(4) 
In addition, our conclusion is consistent with the general principal "that when two 
statutory provisions conflict, the more specific provision will prevail over the more general 
provision " Williams v Public Sen/ Comm'n, 754 P 2d 41,48 (Utah 1988) The termination 
of Parental Rights Act (TPR Act) specifically "provides a judicial process for voluntary and 
involuntary severance of the parent-child relationship " Utah Code Ann § 78-3a-402(1) 
(Supp 1995) Utah's TPR Act, taken in conjunction with section 78-3a-16(2)(f) of the Utah 
Code, which grants exclusive original jurisdiction to juvenile courts in termination 
proceedings, provides a specific statutory framework to follow in termination proceedings 
These specific statutory provisions prevail over that more general provisions of the Utah 
UCCJA, which makes no specific reference to termination proceedings 
Our conclusion is also supported by the principle that" 'the later expression of the 
legislature'" controls when statutes conflict or overlap in their treatment of the same subject 
matter Murray City v Hall, 663 P 2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983) (quoting 2A C Sands, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 51 02 at 290 (4th ed 1973) The Utah Legislature 
enacted the Utah UCCJA in 1980 See Law of Feb 1, 1980, ch 41, 1980 Utah Laws 290 
The legislature enacted the TPR Act twelve years later in 1992 See Law of Feb 26, 1992, 
ch 221, 1992 Utah Laws 826 Therefore, to the degree that conflict or overlap may exist 
between the two acts, the Utah TPR Act supersedes the Utah UCCJA 
Following this statutory scheme, Utah's appellate courts also have kept separate the 
concepts of "child custody" and "termination of parental rights" See, e g, Sanderson v 
Tryon, 739 P 2d 623, 627 (Utah 1987) (noting that "the standard governing actions for 
termination of parental rights is not applicable to child custody disputes"), State ex rel 
J J T, 877 P 2d 161, 165 & nn 4 & 5 (Utah App 1994) (distinguishing between depriving 
parent of custody of child and terminating parent's rights), State ex rel DM, 790 P 2ds 562 
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567-68 & nn 2 & 3 (Utah App 1990) (distinguishing between legal custody and termination 
of parental rights and the requirements of each), InreN H B, 769 P 2d 844,851 (Utah App 
1898) (listing terms "child custody and "termination of parental rights" separately in 
discussion of juvenile court jurisdiction) 
The mother cites cases from other states to support her argument that we should find 
that a case involving the termination of a parent's rights is a child custody proceeding under 
the Utah UCCJA See In re David C, 152 Cal App 3d 1189, 200 Cal Rptr 115 (1984), In 
reAEH,W Wis 2d 277,468 N W2d 190, cert denied, 502 U S 925,112 S Ct 338,116 
L Ed 2d 278 (1991) We are not persuaded by these cases because they are based on 
statutory schemes different from that scheme adopted in Utah 
We conclude that the provisions of the Utah UCCJA do not apply to a case such as 
this that involves the termination of parental rights and obligations 
908 P.2d at 4 348-49. 
A "custody determination" is defined in Utah's UCCJA as "a court decision and court 
orders and instructions providing for the custody of a child, including visitation rights... 
Section 78-45c-2(2). A "modification decree" is defined as "a custody decree which 
modifies or replaces a prior decree, whether made by the court which rendered the prior 
decree or by another court." Section 78-45c-2(7). Utah's UCCJA definitions of the 
foregoing terms are virtually identical to the PKPA definitions of the same terms. 
The same line of reasoning applied by the Utah Court of Appeals may be applied to 
this case: 1. PKPA does not clarify whether a termination proceeding is a custody 
proceeding; 2. Utah's termination statute is a separate and distinct statutory provision 
from Utah's custody and visitation statute, and from PKPA. There are specific statutory 
provisions determining which matters may be dealt with by the district and juvenile courts; 
3. Utah's termination statute is the more specific statutory provision with regard to 
termination; and 4. Utah's appellate courts have kept separate the concepts of termination 
and custody and visitation. 
The parties have argued two Texas cases which considered whether a termination 
proceeding is a custody proceeding under PKPA. One Texas appellate court concluded 
that a termination proceeding was not a custody proceeding under PKPA {Williams v. 
Knott, 690 SW2d 605 (Tex App. Austin 1985)), and another Texas appellate court 
concluded it was (White v. Blake, 859 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. App. Tyler 1993)). Though the 
results were different, both cases analyzed whether a termination proceeding was a 
custody proceeding by construing Texas law, including Texas statutes (of which the Texas 
version of UCCJA is one) and case law. 
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The analyses in the two Texas cases are very similar to the analysis in R.A/.J., 
especially the analysis in Williams, supra, which has a nearly identical result to that of 
R.N.J.. In any event, R.N.J., being a Utah Court of Appeals decision, has the greater 
weight of authority in this case. 
Where "custody determination" and "modification" are similarly defined in PKPA and 
Utah's UCCJA, and the Utah Court of Appeals has already ruled in R.N.J, that a 
termination proceeding is not a "custody proceeding" or "modification" as defined by Utah's 
UCCJA, this Court rules that neither is a termination proceeding a "custody proceeding" 
nor "modification" under PKPA. Accordingly, PKPA does not preclude this Court from 
having subject matter jurisdiction in this case. 
Charles Erik Harris' second jurisdictional argument is that this Court lacks personal 
jurisdiction over Charles Erik Harris in this case where he does not "live in Utah", has not 
had "any involvement with [Utah]", nor has he "purposely availed himself of the rights and 
benefits of [Utah]." 
A termination proceeding involves "status jurisdiction" and as such does not require 
the minimum contacts necessary for in personam jurisdiction in many other kinds of 
litigation. Williams v. Knott, 690 S.W.2d 605, 606 (Tex. App. 3 Dist.1985), citing 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 
(1945), Shaefferv. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed. 2d 683(1977), and 
Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 90, 98 S.Ct. 1690,1695, 56 LEd.2d 132 
(1978). Accordingly, this Court has in personam jurisdiction over Charles Erik Harris in this 
case. 
Charles Erik Harris and his parents, Charles and Leanne Harris, also argue that as 
grandparents with court ordered visitation in the California case, Charles and Leanne 
Harris are "contestants" under PKPA and can "claim rights." However, where this Court 
has ruled that the termination proceeding in this case is not a custody proceeding under 
PKPA, any rights the grandparents may have under PKPA are not available in this case. 
Where Charles and Leanne Harris"have not moved to intervene nor have they been 
granted intervention status in this case, it would be inappropriate for this Court to rule 
further at this time as this Charles and Leanne Harris' rights or standing on this case. 
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Accordingly, Charles Eric Harris' Motion to Dismiss for lack of Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction and Personal Jurisdiction is denied. Counsel for Mark Butler and Karen Butler 
are directed to prepare a formal order in conformance with this Memorandum Decision. 
Dated November f .1 999. 
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 
In Re Marriage of 
Petitioner: KAREN HARRIS 
and 
Respondent: CHARLES ERIK HARRIS 
Case No. D 391902 
STIPULATION AND ORDER TO 
BIFURCATE THE ISSUES OF 
CHILD CUSTODY AND 
VISITATION AND FOR ENTRY 
OF JUDGMENT THEREON 
DATE: July 21, 1995 
TIME: 8:30 a.m. 
DEPT: F-3 
It is hereby stipulated by and between Petitioner, KAREN 
HARRIS, with the approval and consent of her attorneys of record 
Hildy L. Fentin of McDonald & Allen and Respondent, CHARLES ERIK 
HARRIS, with the approval and consent of his attorney of record 
Thomas Huguenor, that the issues of child custody*and visitation 
may be bifurcated from the remaining issues in the dissolution of 
marriage proceeding and that a Judgment may be entered on the 
issues of child custody and visitation as follows: 
1. Bifurcation. The issues of child custody and 
visitation shall be bifurcated from the remaining issues in the 
dissolution of marriage proceeding, and a Judgment of Dissolution 
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1 of Marriage shall be entered on the issues of child custody and 
2 visitation only, incorporating therein by reference the terms of 
3 this Stipulation and Order. 
4 2. Reservation of Jurisdiction. The court shall sever and 
5 reserve jurisdiction over all other issues including but not 
6 limited to the nature, value and extent of community property of 
7 the parties, the division of property, child support, spousal 
8 support, attorneys fees and costs, restraining orders and the 
9 marital status of the parties. 
10 3. Temporary Orders. Except as modified herein, all 
LI pendente lite orders presently in effect or entered hereafter, 
.2 including but not limited to personal and property restraining 
3 orders and stay-away orders, shall remain in full force and 
4 (I effect subsequent to the granting of this Order and the Entry of 
any Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage (child custody and 
visitation only) until the time of trial or further order of the 
court. 
4* Child custody/Visitation. The recommendation of Daniel 
O'Roarty, Ph*D., filed with the court on June 9, 1995, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein 
by reference, shall become the Order of the Court as specifically 
set forth herein. 
a. Legal Custody. Petitioner, KAREN HARRIS, shall 
have sole legal custody of the parties' minor child, Emily 
Harris, born October 26, 1994. 
b. Physical custody. Petitioner, KAREN HARRIS, shall 
have sole physical custody of the parties' minor child and shall 
be permitted to move, with her daughter, to the State of Maryland 
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or after Saturday, August 5, 1995. 
c. Visitation. At such time as Petitioner moves to 
-yland and so long as Respondent, CHARLES ERIK HARRIS/ complies 
:h the psychotherapy, drug testing and Narcotics Anonymous 
areinafter f,NAn) provisions set forth hereinbelow at paragraph 
and does not test positive on any drug test, Respondent shall 
ve supervised visitation rights with the minor child in the 
:ate of Maryland upon thirty days written notice to Petitioner 
i advance of each visit. Said visits shall be supervised 
irough a public program or privately contracted supervisor who 
or bvj ctf^ef o£ ihe, Qx<\. £ W 
s mutually agreed to by the parties0A Visits shall be for tntee 
ours in duration, and shall be set at such times as is mutually 
igreed to by the parties/^and shall not include overnights. Any 
;hange in the duration of Respondent's visits with the minor 
zhild shall be determined by the person supervising the 
visitations or further court order, 
5. Notification of Residence/Employment, Respondent shall 
notify Petitioner in writing,^within 48 hours of any change of 
his residence and place of employment and shall provide to 
Petitioner the address and telephone number of his residence, and 
the name, address and telephone number of his place of 
employment. 
6. Parenting Class• Respondent shall complete a parent 
education program to increase his knowledge of child development 
issues and dynamics. Said program shall be completed within one 
year and Respondent shall provide to Petitioner a certificate of 
completion of said parenting course. 
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%z Petitioner's Counseling. Petitioner shall continue in I 
counseling/^to reinforce parenting skills and abilities which will 
enhance her self-esteem and provide her with greater autonomy, 
10. Visitation Pending Petitioner's Move. Pending 
Petitioner^ move to Maryland, Respondent shall have the 
following supervised^visitation rights which shall be supervised 
by Creative Visitation: 
Saturday, July 22, 1995, 2 hours; 
Tuesday, July 25, 1995, 2 hours; 
Sunday, July 3 0, 1995, 2 hours; 
Tuesday, August 1, 1995, 2 hours; and 
Thursday, August 3, 1995, 2 hours. 
In the event said times are not available to the 
Creatiefi Visitation program, visitations shall take place as 
mutually agreed and arranged by Petitioner, Respondent and 
Creative Visitation. Sa\A ^stfa^OTS S ^ \ V?e Sc^rJN^ JM L ^ £ a : 
3c 
fc 
11. Communicatiorr/iCo-Parenting Sfcills. Pending ^v^^p^cc^V^: 
Petitioner's raovo to Maryland, Petitioner and Respondent jsjiaUJ^,,. 
/^participate in four one-hour sessions of counseling; two sessions' 
(see sft*>-r 
with Lydia Roper and two sessions with No^l Evans, to discuss co-
parenting and communication issues. Said sessions shall take 
place prior to August 5, 1995 as follows: 
a. Lydia Roper: Friday, July 21, 1995 at 1:00 p.m.; 
b. Lydia Roper: Tuesday, July 25, 1995 at 8:30 a.m.; 
c. No^l Evans: At such times as are determined 
i I 
between Petitioner, Respondent and Dr. Evans•
 K ^ • * . ± \^, -rl* 
sYsW ? SM&lJ 
hnrrari nn-thr nnrmmptipris-that P e t i t i o n e r vii-1 r e s i d e in Maryland 
with her parents for a period of twelve aonths andj^fmt 
u^ Vo V* £®V> a^aoi.e ixjci\\<j^rdr\u, \>N te*h£\C^ rro\\) putf *O vro^rift octets 
Kooponden-fc; will r^ aid-e-i-n thQ Stato of California. \ .j*,.. 
o£ vc^tec^. A ^ \ \ \ 0 D D ^ } voviYiooercv^ w r>t>*fo WoooecftT* u/mnq 
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7* Psychotherapy/Drug Testing/Narcotic* Anonymous <NA) 
Participation. Respondent's rights of visitation provided herein 
are specifically contingent upon his compliance with the 
following: 
a. Commencing July 21, 1995, Respondent shall 
participate in weekly individual psychotherapy with Nool Bvang, 
pSs-Dr^ Respondent shall authorize B*H«—Eyano to provide to ^v^v 
-\VvC ^ V-ONO^-V y^  ^ ^ 
Petitioner a monthly attendance record verifying Respondent's 
weekly participation in psychotherapy. 
b. Commencing July 21, 1995, Respondent shall submit / 
to random urine drug screens one time a week at the San Diego ryfh 
Health AllianceX Drug screening shall cover all drugs including 
marijuana. Respondent shall authorise the San Diego Health 
/5/ c< o^berc^q ^eeov ra tesc\^V\A <J 
Alliance.to release the-rksults ox each drug test to his 
therapist,—N-eel-Evemg, and to Petitioner^ therapist, iiydiet 
Ropjsr, who shall be authorized to provide a copy of the results 
to Petitioner. 
c. Commencing July 21, 1995, Respondent shall 
actively participate in Narcotics Anonymous and shall participate 
in weekly meetings two times each week. Respondent shall provide 
Petitioner with the name of his sponsor and shall provide to 
Petitioner, on a monthly basis, a copy of his attendance record 
which shall be signed by his sponsor-
ed Telephone Contact* ftfc^HK?h"-<fej^re 
oJ^a-'Grawgk^-^-c^ with hoa father Respondeat shall have 
telephone contactxtwo times per week on Mondays and Wednesdays 
between 6:30 and 7:30 p^m* Eastern Standard Time-
/ / / 
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>E i COURT OF C, JFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 
FAM...Y COURT BUILDING. 1501-55 SIXTH. SAN OlEGO. CA 92101-1946 
NOBTH COUNTY BRANCH, 325 S. MELROSE, VISTA, CA 92083-6627 
EAST COUNTY COURT, 250 E. MAIN, EL CAJON, CA 92020-3913 
SOUTH BAY COURT. 500 THIRD, CHULA VISTA, CA 91910-G694 
ONER(S) 
v^ren "tWiis 
>NDENT(S) Onaftes £<\\L lWf\S 
COURT USE ONLY 
HEARING DATE . . " \ \ S \ i M j T 
..... o*>>r\ I ' TIME 
OEPT 
y-3o 
STIPULATION AND ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
(Local Rules, Division 111, Rule 1.6(g)) 
CASE NUMBER 
3> 2rtW09i 
ner- D Husband,, TZJ^Wife, C3 Present^ C 
Attorney 4 l U ^ l T ^ n t i V " ) 
Q Not present, represented by 
*dent 
Attorney 
" & Husband D Wife, . p Present D Wc pt present , represented by 
•HE PARTIES STIPULATE AND AGREE as follows: 
W VterraVons shs>l\ Wlfe^  rM£^r>'for, ran 
^. 9e+rhnnfiT 9,V\ s>\\ g,van Aromeof 
ifgfe^f DUO ^E AS 
XM~ occur at <t)c VU3 
h3 \ / I ^4- rftfv/ TO,n 
ffHSQt4 
V nn rrpfr*, Hfcn pi - f r r o e , ^ 
TER CONTINUED TO: et M. 
Attorney for Husband 
SIGN? 
ilation and agreement. 
Attorney for w /a 
TURE OF PARTIES 
understand it fully and request the Codft to make our stiptoation 
lent the Court^6rder. We understand that wilKul failure to comply wrth the provisions of ^iis order will\j>e a 
f Court and may be punished by fine and imprisonment We waive all further not|/2fe of this order. 
* read the entire stk 
y< Husband 
D and Dated 
Wife 
Judge of tho Supa/ior Court 
•t6) STIPULATION AND ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSc JL n 
13. There shall be no change in the foregoing custody and 
visitation arrangement except upon a shoving of a substantial 
change in circumstances which would include, in this instance, 
Respondent's ability to establish consistency and stability in 
his life and in all matters mentioned hereinabove. 
14. Enforcement of Terms of Stipulation - Pees and Coats. 
Should it be necessary for either party to bring an action in 
this or any other court for the enforcement of any of the 
provisions of this Stipulation, the prevailing party shall be 
entitled to an award from the other party of his or her 
reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred in the action. 
15. Acknowledgments. Each party to this Stipulation 
acknowledges and declares that he or she respectively: 
a. Is fully and completely informed as to the facts 
relating to the subject matter of this Stipulation and as to the 
rights and liabilities of both parties; 
b. Enters into this Stipulation voluntarily, free 
from fraud, undue influence, coercion or duress of any kind; 
c. Has given careful and mature thought to the making 
of this Stipulation; and 
d. Fully and completely understands the legal effect 
of each provision of this Stipulation. 
There have been no promises, agreements, or 
undertakings of either of the parties to the other, except as set 
forth in this Stipulation, relied upon by either as a matter of 
inducement to enter into this Stipulation. Each party has read 
the Stipulation and is fully aware of its contents and its legal 
effect. 
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1 16. Waivers• As to the issues of child custody and 
2 visitation only, each party waives: 
3 a. Notice of time and place of trial, Statement of 
4 Decision, Notice of Entry of Judgment, Notice of Appeal of the 
5 Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage addressing the child custody 
6 and visitation issues; 
7 b« Time to appeal the Judgment of Dissolution of 
8 Marriage (custody and visitation only) and all rights to make a 
9 motion for a new trial or for reconsideration; and 
10 c. Any and all other notices pertaining to this 
11 proceeding. 
12 As to the issues of child custody and visitation only, 
13 the court may enter, upon application by Petitioner consistent 
14 with this Order, a Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage (child 
15 custody/visitation only) without waiting for the required periods 
16 for notice of appeal. 
17 17, Release of Restraining Order, The restraining order 
18 providing that neither party shall remove the minor child from 
19 the State of California or the County of San Diego shall be 
20 released and dissolved with respect to Petitioner. Pursuant to 
21 the terms of this stipulation, Petitioner may permanently move to 
22 the State of Maryland with the minor child on or after Saturday, 
23 August 5, 1995. Accordingly, the provisions set forth in Code of 
24' civil Procedure §917.7 providing for a stay for thirty days of 
25 any Judgment entered providing for the removal of a minor child 
26 from the State of California, shall be waived, 
27 18. The parties hereto hereby agree and acknowledge that 
28 they have read the foregoing Stipulation and Order, that they 
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understand it fully and request the court to make this 
Stipulation the court's order, The parties further represent and 
acknowledge that they understand that willful failure to comply 
with the provisions of this Order shall be a contempt of court 
and may be punished by fine and imprisonment. The parties 
further waive all further notice of this Order. 
Dated: ifaftsr Dated: *7 • 2 ) • 4*£ 
1EN HARRIS, Petitioner 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
Dated: -lIsvlQ^ 
McDonald & Allen 
Hildy pi Fentin, Esq. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
5S "ERIK HARRIS, 
Respondent 
Dated: "?'• 2 / - <9 
_b 
/ he? £~*L+O />? 
Thomas Hugu 
Attorney fo 
xj, Esq. 
spondent 
ORDER 
Upon reading and considering the foregoing, and for good 
cause shown, IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: '1^X\~~/1 ^ 
JUDGE OF ) T/iE SUPERIOR COURT 
WESLEY R MASON 
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1 -^ ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATIOHNEY (*««. AOJtOSS) TELEPHONE NC 
J . ( 6 1 9 ) 2 B 2 - 2 0 S ' 
' H i l d y L . F e n t i n , E s q . ( B a r # 1 1 1 5 1 8 ) 
'cDONALD & ALLEN 
50 W e s t " C " S t r e e t , S u i t e 2 0 5 0 
an D i e g o , CA 9 2 1 0 1 
rT0RNEYF0R«*«): K a r e n H a r r i s 
SUPERIOR COURT Of-' CALIF0 RNIA, COUNTY OF
 S A N DIEGO 
STREETADORESS
 1 5 5 i _ 5 5 s i x t h A v e n u e 
MAILING ADDRESS.
 S a n D i e g o , CA 9 2 1 0 1 
CITY AND ZIP C 0 0 E : 
BRANCH NAME: F a m i l y C o u r t 
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: KAREN HARRIS 
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: CHARLES ERIK HARRIS 
CLAIMANT: CHARLES E . HARRIS, J R . a n d 
1 LEANNE CATHERINE HARRIS 
FINDINGS AND ORDER AFTER HEARING 
1 FOR COURT US€ ONLY 
CASE NUMBER. 
D 3 9 1 9 0 2 
1. This proceeding was heard 
on (date): 1 1 / 2 0 / 9 5 at (time): 1 : 4 5 p . m . inDept . :F-5 
by Judge (name): E d w a r d B . H u n t i n g t o n • Temporary Judge 
Room: 
• Petitioner/plaintiff present QQ Attorney present (name): H i l d y L . F e n t i n , E s q , 
I 1 Respondent/defendant present • Attorney present (name): 
CX) Claimant present CX] Attorney present (name). Thomas M. Huguenot", E s q . 
On the order to show cause or motion filed (dale): 8 / 2 / 9 5 by (name): C l a i m a n t s 
Z THE COURT ORDERS 
3. Custody and visitation: 
4. Child support: 
5. Spousal-Family support: 
6. Property orders: 
fX I As attached 
• As attached 
I 1 As attached 
I I As attached 
7. Domestic Violence Miscellaneous Orders 
8. Other orders: n As attached 
9. ED Attorney fees (specify amount): $ 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
I I Not applicable 
PCI Not applicable 
CS] Not applicable 
[2D Not applicable 
I 1 As attached 
CS3 Not applicable 
[3D Not applicable 
L ^ J j v~, , v . ^ - . , ~ w w . w ~ • payable as child support • payable as spousal support 
Payable to (name and address): H i l d y L . F e n t i n , E s q . o f M c D o n a l d § A l l e n , 
550 West "C" S t r e e t , S u i t e 2050, San Diego, C a l i f o r n i a 92101 
Payable •forthwith GQ other (specify): Commencing 1 /1 /96 , i n monthly i n s t a l l m e n t s c 
$100.00 u n t i l p a i d i n f u l l . 
10. All other issues are reserved until further order of the court. 
Date: 
Approved as conforming to court order. 
• 
JUDGL Of 1NL 5UPLMIOH COUHF 
n H T'
SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY FOR | A PETITIONCR/PLAINTIFF • RESPONDCNT/DCFENDANT 
PHOMAS M. HUGUERQJR, A t t o r n e y f o r C l a i m a n t s 
(Continued) Pag a 
Form Adopted by Rulo 1296 31 
Jud»c»al Council of California 
FINDINGS AND U H O E R AFfEh HtAnKiG 
fFamilv 1 *^w - nnmn^ir. \r.~i » , ~ — i ~ » — 
TACHMENT TO MARRIAGE OF HARRIS 
JDINGS AND ORDER AFTER HEARING SDSC CASE NO. D 391902 
EARING: 11/20/95) 
VISITATION. 
Based on the oral stipulation of the parties in open court, the paternal 
grandparents, LEANNE CATHERINE HARRIS and CHARLES E. HARRIS, 
JR. (hereinafter the "Claimants"), shall have visitation wkh Emily Hope Harris, 
born October 26, 1994, as set forth in paragraphs 1-5 (Agreements) and 
paragraphs 1, 2 (partial), and 3, 4 and 5 (Recommendations) of the Family Court 
Services recommendation of.Sandra Boyles, MFCC, dated October 2, 1995, 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A," as follows: 
(a) Claimants shall visit with Emily in the county and state in which 
Petitioner resides, and shall provide to Petitioner 30 days written 
notice in advance of Claimants' visitation with the minor child. 
(b) Unless otherwise agreed to by Petitioner and Claimants, for the first 
two days of each visit, the visit shall occur in Petitioner's residence, 
to allow the child to reacquaint herself with Claimants, and the 
Claimants to familiarize themselves with the minor child's 
adjustment, routines and developmental needs. 
(c) After a period of time, to be determined as set forth horcinbclow at 
subparagraph (j), the minor child shall visit with Claimants, away 
from Petitioner's home and supervision, for four to eight hours each 
day. The exact hours shall be determined by mutual agreement of 
Petitioner and Claimants based on the child's needs at flic time. 
Petitioner shall have the final say on the pick-up and return times 
each day. 
(d) Claimants shall provide Petitioner with an itinerary, a local address 
and telephone number, before removing the minor child from 
Petitioner's residence. 
(e) There shall be no overnight visitations with Claimants unless 
mutually agreed upon by Petitioner and Claimants. 
Pago 2 of 3 
ATTACHMENT TO MARRIAGE OF IIARRIS 
FINDINGS AND ORDER AFTER HEARING SDSC CASE NO. D 391902 
(HEARING: 11/20/95) 
(0 At no time shall Respondent, CHARLES ERIK HARRIS, be 
present during visits between Claimants and the minor child. 
(g) Claimants shall not smoke when the minor child is in their presence. 
(h) Claimants may have reasonable telephone contact with the minor 
child. 
(i) Claimants and Petitioner shall keep each other informed of their 
current addresses and telephone numbers at all times. 
Upon reading and considering the pleadings filed with the court and oral 
argument of counsel, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
(j) The frequency and length of each of Claimants' visits shall be as 
follows: 
i) 1996. Four times per year for up to seven days, which shall 
include the minimum two-day visit at Petitioner's home; 
ii) 1997. Six times per year for up to seven days, which shall 
include the minimum two-day visit at Petitioner's home; and 
iii) 1998. So long as there have been no problems in the 
visitation schedule and Claimants are complying with the 
terms of the court order as set forth herein, six times per year 
for up to 10 days in duration, which shall include the 
minimum two-day visit at Petitioner's home. 
(k) Prior to Claimants exercising their visitation rights as set forth 
herein, Claimants shall attend and pay for four counseling sessions 
with Noll Evans, Ph.D., to address the issue of abuse contained in 
Petitioner's pleadings. After the completion of the four sessions, 
Claimants shall instruct Noll Evans to provide to Petitioners 
attorney proof of attendance of said sessions. 
(1) The court shall reserve jurisdiction to review the visitation orders 
contained herein. 
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 
In Re Marriage of ) CASE NO. D 391902 
Petitioner: KAREN HARRIS 
AMENDED 
and ) ORDER AFTER HEARING 
14 
Claimants: CHARLES E. HARRIS, JR. 
15 and LEANNE HARRIS 
16 
17 The first motion in this case was filed by Petitioner on 4/29/96 to terminate 
18 the grandparents' visitation which had been set by stipulated order on 11/20/95. On 
19 8/15/96 Petitioner filed an additional motion for a psychological evaluation to determine 
20 if the grandparents' unsupervised visits with Emily are in the child's best interests. 
21 During this period a report and recommendation was filed by Ms. Boyies of Family 
22 Court Services dated 7-24-96. By stipulation in Court on 11/20/95 the parties adopted 
23 the 10/2/95 Family Court Services' report by Ms. Boyies. In that order the frequency 
24 of visitation periods was set at four in 1996, increased to six in 1997 for up to seven 
25 days and increased in 1998 for up to ten days. 
26 The Court took testimony fiom Ms. Boyies, reviewed the cnluc history ol 
27 the file, read the grandparents' factual declarations on both sides of the family, anc 
28 reviewed Dr. O'Roarty's evaluation. 
1 The Court did not consider the declarati s of either Dr. Rasmusson or Dr. 
2 Evans. 
3 The sole issue presented to the Court is 'hether to continue the Court-
4 ordered visitation by the grandparents and if so, should tht ,ourt order a psychological 
5 evaluation. 
6 The Court finds that in spite of the significant shortcomings of Respondent 
7 Charles Erik Harris, the grandparents are, in fact, entitled to continue their right under 
8 the law and under the Court's existing orders to have visitation with their granddaughter, 
9 Emily. Having read all of the declarations, the Court does not find the requisite change 
) I of circumstances to terminate the grandparents' visitation The conflicts that have 
occurred are the normal conflicts between opposing families in a dissolution. The 
conflicts are not sufficient to trigger a significant change in the terms of visitation. 
The Court hereby makes one modification as to the frequency of the visits 
and sets the number of visits at a maximum of four visits per year for up to seven days. 
The reason for the limitation of four visits per year is that at Emily's age more than four 
is burdensome for all parties. As Emily grows older the Court reserves the right to 
increase or decrease the number of visits per year based upon Emily's age appropriate 
needs. This shall include the first two days at Petitioner's home or a place to be 
mutually agreed upon out of the home. This shall continue until further order of the 
Court. 
After the first two days it is the Court's order that visitation shall take place 
out of the home for a period of up to six hours each. If mother feels that it is necessary 
for any reason she may designate a one-day break during the remaining five days. 
(This could be for rest, for church, for a birthday or any other reason.) She is to advise 
he grandparents at the commencement of each visitation period. This is not to reduce 
n any way the total of seven visitation days. 
If the parties fail to agree on the visitation hours then visitation shall 
ommence at 10:00 a.m. and end no later than 4:00 p.m. The grandparents shall 
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determine when to return Emily home based upon Emily's needs and wishes and within 
the above-Stated times, If petitioner for any reason does not have Emily ready at 10.00 
a.m. the 4:00 p.m. return time may be adjusted commensurately. 
The Court at this time makes no order for a psychological evaluation 
There does not appear to be any basis for such an evaluation and the Court is 
persuaded that the information would surely demonstrate that there is a strong anger 
or conflict between mother and her family and the paternal grandparents. 
Therefore, neither the mother nor the grandparents are to disparage each 
other or in any way convey their beliefs and attitudes regarding this case to Emily. 
All other orders and Family Court Services recommendations not in conflict 
with this order are to remain in effect as orders of the Court. 
DATED: / // ^'j / <H 7 
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1 i SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 
?_" CASE NO. D 391902 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF PERSONAL SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am not a party to the cause referred to herein 
On the date as shown below, at San Diego, California, I personally served 
a true copy of AMENDED ORDER AFTER HEARING in a separate envelope 
addressed to each addressee as listed below: 
Danielle E. Negroni 
McDonald & Allen 
550 West C Street, Suite 2050 
San Diego, CA92101 
Paul W. Leehey 
205 West Alvarado Street 
Fallbrook, CA 92028 
ft p J'hnu £ MAHTOW jOj 
NOV 2 2 W6 
8y T DEEGAiy 0ecut\ 
JATED: 
NOV 2 2 1996 
KENNETH E. MARTONE 
Clerk of the Superior Court 
BfW\MJ \h&af\ 
I erry U^tegan, Dejputy 
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LAW OFFICE OF PAUL W. LEEHEY \^J K^ 8 I 
205 West Alvarado Street 
Fallbrook, CA 92028 rp 
Telephone: (760) 723-0711 If
 K,| ['. ,>• ... 
State Bar #92009 °-' • "•• - .';,';'wJ( /flj 
Attorney for Claimants JAN 2 I IQQQ 
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, NORTH COUNTY BRANCH 
In Re Marriage of 
PETITIONER: KAREN HARRIS 
and 
RESPONDENT: CHARLES ERIK HARRIS 
CLAIMANTS: CHARLES E. HARRIS, JR 
and LEANNE HARRIS 
CASE NO. D 391902 TXA 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE RE: CONTEMPT 
COMES NOW, the Court, the Honorable Thomas Ashworth Judge of the 
Superior Court presiding, on January 20, 1998 in Department F-3 of 
the above entitled Court, upon the Order to Show Cause and 
Declaration for Contempt filed on December 1, 1997 by Claimants 
LEANNE AND CHARLES E. HARRIS JR., as to Citee KAREN HARRIS, now KAREN 
BUTLER, Petitioner herein; and after the Court advised Citee of the 
potential fine and/or jail time if found guilty of each count of 
contempt, and of her rights, including the right not to testify, the 
right to cross examine witnesses, the right to present evidence on 
her behalf, the right to have an attorney represent her and if not 
that an attorney may be appointed for her and the right to represent 
herself; and upon Citee stating that she desired to represent herself 
and to go forward with the proceedings; the Court proceeded with the 
hearing and thereafter upon hearing the opening statement of 
Claimants' counsel, with no opening statement by Citee, the testimony 
of Claimant LEANNE HARRIS, with no cross examination, testimony or 
evidence presented by Citee, and the closing argument of Claimants' 
Counsel, with no argument made by Citee, the COURT FOUND AND ORDERED 
\S FOLLOWS: 
1. AS TO COUNT ONE: The Court finds Citee guilty of Count 
>ne, upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence, for failing to 
omply with the Court's order entered on December 15, 1997, 
hereafter confirmed on October 30, 1996 and November 21, 1996, to 
eep Claimants informed at all times of Citee's address and phone 
imbers, specifically her address and phone number upon her move from 
iryland to Utah after December 1st 1996; and specifically finds that 
tid order was a valid order of the Court, that Citee had knowledge 
said order through her representation of Counsel when said order 
s made and reaffirmed, that Citee failed to notify Claimants of her 
dress and phone number and that said failure was a wilful violation 
the Court's Order. 
Based thereon, as to Count One, the Court sentences Citee KAREN 
*RIS, now KAREN BUTLER, to five (5) days custody in the San Diego 
inty Jail, but suspends said sentence and places Citee on probation 
a period of tv/o years conditioned upon Citee's compliance with 
the existing Orders of the Court, with any violation of any such 
er shown by a preponderance of the evidence to result in the 
osition of the aforesaid sentence. 
2. AS TO COUNT TWO; The Court finds Citee guilty of Count 
upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence, for failing to 
ply with the Court's Order entered on December lb, 1997, 
treafter confirmed on October 30, 1996 and November 21, 1996, to 
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j allow Claimants vis'itation with their granddaughter Emily on December 
1, 1996 and thereafter; and specifically finds that said order was a 
valid order of the Court, that Citee had knowledge of said order 
through her representation of Counsel when caid order was uu\de, that 
on November 1, 1996 Claimants properly gave thirty (30) days notice 
of their right to exercise visitation to begin on December 1, 1996, 
that Citee failed to comply with the Court's Order by not allowing 
Claimants' visitation with Emily beginning on December 1, 1996 and 
that said failure was a wilful violation of the Court's Order. 
Based thereon, as to Count Two, the Court sentences Citee KAREN 
HARRIS, now KAREN BUTLER, to five (5) days custody in the San Diego 
County Jail, but suspends said sentence and places said Citee on 
probation for a period of two years conditioned upon Citee's 
compliance with all the existing Orders of the Court, with any 
violation of any such order shown by a preponderance of the* evidence 
to result in the imposition of the aforesaid sentence. 
3. The Court finds that the financial requests of Claimants 
for attorneys fees, costs and expenses will be more properly heard on 
February 23, 1998 when Claimants have an Order to Show Cause set 
regarding the same, and at which time the Court will have the 
opportunity to review the financial situation of both Claimants and 
Petitioner, as well as the conduct of Petitioner; and base& thereon 
continues and defers those financial issues to the hearing of 
February 23, 1998. 
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4. The Court, further notes that Petitioner KAREN HARRIS, nov/ 
BUTLER, represents that her address and phone number of record in 
these proceedings, and as required under the existing orders of the 
Court, is as follows: Karen Butler, 655 Medoland Drive, Brigham 
City, Utah, 04302, phone number (435) 723-9207. 
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ATTACHMENT TO FINDINGS AND 
ORDER AFTER HEARING 
(HEARING 5/5/99) 
CUSTODY AND VISITATION 
Upon review of the evidence presented and after argument of 
:ounsel, the Court made its findings on the record adopting the 
'amily Court Services Report and Recommendations therein dated 
larch 29, 1999 by Sandra Boyles, MFCC, counselor Family Court 
ervices, with the exception of recommendations items number three 
3) and seven (7) , as set forth in the attached copy thereof 
ncorporated herein as Exhibit nAfl. 
The Court further orders that the Claimant Grandparents 
harles E. Harris Jr. and Leeann Harris shall not permit any 
ontact between the minor grandchild, Emily, and Respondent Father 
harles Erik Harris when they have the physical custody of said 
hild. 
The Court made no orders as to Respondent Charles Erik Harris7 
rder to Show Cause filed on February 25, 1999, which was continued 
nd set for the same date and time, due to no appearance of 
espondent at the hearing. 
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lopment and how she can rake the cmld's transitions rore 
ortable and enjoyable. 
MMrlMDftTTONS: 
s therefore respectfully recommended: 
Until the child starts public school, the paternal 
grandparents shall have four 7-day weeks with the child. Tne 
first week to occur after this hearing shall occur at a place 
selected by the paternal grandparents within the state of 
Utah. The child shall have overnights with the grandparents 
and shall be within easy access of the mother's residenfce in 
the event that the child .needs to return home during the week, 
Tne grandparents shall be the ones to determine if the child 
needs to return before the seventh day. During the week, the 
child shall have at least two telephone contacts with the 
mother. 
All subsequent visits with the paternal grandparents may occur 
at the grandparents' home in San Diego County. Either of the 
grandparents or another adult familiar to the child, shall 
travel with the child to and from the grandparents' residence 
in San Diego County. 
Tne exact visitation weeks shall be determined by 30 days 
prior written notice to the mother. The mother shall notify 
the grandparents in advance of any vacation plans her family 
may have so that the grandparents' dates do not interfere. 
The grandparents' visits shall not occur at times of major 
holidays unless agreed upon by the mother. 
During the child's visits to San Diego, the grandparents may 
make the child available for supervised visits v/ith the father 
at a professional agency if agreed upon by the grandparents 
and the father. At no time shall the father have contact with 
the child that is solely supervised by the grandparents. 
The grandparents shall have reasonable telephone contacts with 
the child of at least once a week. If the child p not 
available when they call, the mother shall assure the child 
returns the call within 24 hours. 
All correspondence from the grandparents to the cnild 
including packages and gifts shall be shared with the child 
upon receipt. The mother shall respond to the grandparents 
within one week by mail or telephone in order to acknowledge 
receipt of the correspondence or package and the child's 
Tf the mother -has specific requests for 
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limitations en the numoer of Christmas items to be received, 
she shall notify the grandparents in advance and they shall 
make every effort to be sensitive to the mother's requests. 
During the child's visits with the grandparents, they shall 
assure that she is not exposed to cigarette smoke in buildings 
or vehicles. 
The mother shall be involved in counseling with a licensed 
clinical therapist regarding issues related to the blended 
family. She shall sign a release for the therapist to 
communicate with the undersigned regarding , the 
recommendations, Tne purpose of the therapy shall be to 
assist the mother, ^stepfather and stepchildren in 
understanding Emily's need for a positive relationship with 
her father's family and the dynamics of such a relationship. 
The grandparents shall be available for communication with the 
therapist if the therapist feels it is appropriate. 
All prior orders not in conflict with this parenting plan 
shall remain in full force and effect. 
Respectfully submitted, 
// 
SANDRA BOYLES, MFCC 
C o u n s e l o r 
( 6 1 9 ) 5 5 7 - 2 1 1 6 
55/mcLm 
:c: Charles Harris 
Leanne Harris 
Paul Lehey, Esq-
Karen Harris 
Kildy fentin, Esq, 
